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Regulation through Social Norms. 
 
 
Abstract: Social norms can have a powerful influence on behavior. We posit that 
peer pressure may lead companies to behave in ways that are not dictated by direct economic 
incentives.  Extending prior research findings that the introduction of state-level anti-takeover 
laws affected transparency levels among firms incorporated in those states, we analyze the 
behavior of peer firms that were not covered by the new laws, and thus had no direct 
incentives to change their behavior.  We find that changes in practice among the largest firms 
alter the practices of firms in the same industry that are not subject to the change in legal 
regime.  Comparative statics indicate that the effect is stronger when signals sent by the 
‘trendsetters’ are more salient, but is not affected by the economic or legal situation of the 
“followers”.  Firms mimicking the trendsetters experienced a decline in stock price. 
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Regulation through Social Norms 
 
I. Introduction 
Examples of individuals following fads are common, from the clothes people wear to 
the music they listen to.  Although many of these choices are benign and fickle, others are 
more persistent, more costly, and more difficult to reconcile with self-interest.  An example 
of this are the billions of dollars spent on tipping by North Americans.  Tipping can be a way 
to ensure quality service for a customer regularly frequenting a restaurant, but most 
Americans leave tips in places they have no intention to visit again.  In contrast, in most other 
countries, patrons do not pay more than what they are charged.  This behavior is driven by 
social norms even without explicit or social enforcement and international travelers often 
check these norms before visiting a country.  However, while there are numerous examples of 
individuals being driven by social norms, the effect of norms on organizations, on profit-
maximizing firms in particular, has not been clearly established. This study investigates their 
impact in the context of corporate financial transparency.   
Social norms can be defined as the beliefs held by a group or a community about how 
members should behave in a given context.  They can be powerful regulators of human 
behavior, as recognized by researchers in social psychology (e.g., Sherif 1936; Ash (1951)), 
economics (e.g., Akerlof (1980), Bernheim (1994)) and sociology (e.g., Merton 1957; 
Coleman 1990). However, their influence has largely been overlooked by the accounting 
literature. In essence, we argue that individuals and organizations do things for no other 
reason than the fact that other individuals and organizations are doing them. Indeed socially 
desirable outcomes can emerge from social norms even in the absence of economic 
incentives.  For example, Arrow (1971) sees social norms as a way to improve collective 
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optimality and to compensate for market failures. Disclosing information (like tipping) is a 
costly activity that may bring benefits to the party engaging in it, but also generates 
potentially large externalities that are unlikely to be captured by the disclosing firm (or 
tipper).  Social norms may help regulators address these externalities. 
However, simply observing that the behavior of agents is correlated is not sufficient to 
validate the hypothesis that actions are driven by social norms, as confronted with the same 
problem, agents are likely to adopt a similar solution.  To test our hypothesis, we focus on an 
exogenous shock to disclosure: the passage of business combinations (BC) laws in 30 US 
states between 1985 and 1991. As noted by Giroud and Mueller (2010), BC laws are 
designed to prevent corporate raiders from gaining access to the target firm’s assets for the 
purpose of paying down their acquisition debt, thus making hostile takeovers more difficult.  
By reducing fear of a hostile takeover, BC laws weaken corporate governance and create 
more opportunity for managerial slack.  Armstrong et al. (2012) use the passage of these laws 
as a source of exogenous variation to identify changes in firms’ information environments.  
They find that firms covered by BC laws improve the information environments relative to a 
control group (of firms that were not covered by the new laws).  We, in turn, examine the 
effect of this change in transparency on firms that were not directly affected by the passage of 
the laws.  Unlike their peers who directly responded to the exogenous shock, they had no 
direct incentive to change their behavior.  
We find that the change in practice among the five largest firms in a given industry 
covered by the change in regulation (the “trendsetters”) has an influence on industry practice.  
Our results hold if we consider the entire sample but also if we focus only on firms located in 
states not affected by the passage of the law.  They also hold if we define a firm as a 
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“trendsetter” only if it is incorporated in a state where the BC law changed in the preceding 
year.   
A priori, our results can be explained either by a desire to comply with a change in 
social norms or by “direct” economic mechanisms.  Our additional empirical findings are 
broadly consistent with the former but fail to support the latter.  Specifically, comparative 
statics indicate that the effects are stronger when the signal sent by the trendsetters is more 
salient.  For example, the effects are stronger when trendsetters are closer (either 
geographically, socially or economically) to followers, when trendsetters are larger (in 
absolute value), and when the signal is more consistent.  Conversely, smaller firms, firms 
operating in industries with more stringent norms and firms located in areas where following 
social norms is a priori more important are more affected.  The effects are also stronger when 
trendsetters and followers are part of a common professional network but the effect of these 
networks does not subsume the direct effect of social norms.   
In contrast, we find no evidence that economic variables such as growth opportunities, 
leverage, capital issuances or financial constraints affect the relationship.  If our baseline 
results were driven by a cost-benefit analysis, we would expect these trade-offs to vary across 
firms, and the magnitude of the effect to be associated with firm characteristics such as the 
ones we consider.  In contrast, the magnitude of the BC law direct effect is affected by these 
conditioning variables.  Similarly, we find no evidence that the propensity to follow the 
trendsetters is affected by the likelihood of litigation or enforcement actions.  The lack of 
cross-sectional economic- or litigation-based variation in the effect is inconsistent with an 
alternative explanation based on cost-benefit analysis.  We then explore whether managerial 
“herding” driven by a willingness to reduce the risk of CEO termination caused by departing 
from industry practices explains our baseline results.  Inconsistent with this alternative 
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explanation, we find that firms where the CEO is more likely to be terminated do not respond 
more to the trendsetters.  Finally, we examine if followers learn about the optimal level of 
disclosure by observing the changes made by the trendsetters.  Inconsistent with this view, we 
observe that firms following the same directional change experience negative stock returns in 
the following year. 
Our contribution to the accounting literature is to examine social norms empirically.  
Williamson (2000) presents a four-level model to analyze social institutions: resource 
allocation alignment (how prices, quantities or incentive alignment affect marginal decisions), 
governance (how governance is aligned with transactions), institutional environment (how 
the institutional environment affects decision) and informal institutions (how phenomena 
such as customs, norms or religion affect decisions).  A vast body of research in accounting 
(and in finance, economics and law) has explored the first three dimensions.  For example, 
neoclassical economics or agency theory has investigated optimal and sub-optimal allocations 
of resources.  Numerous studies of boards of directors, managerial characteristics and audit 
firms have examined different governance aspects.  Transaction cost economics, the 
economics of property rights, and positive political theory have all examined how institutions 
and contracts affect economic behavior.  However, the research on informal institutions, 
particularly archival research in accounting, is much less developed.  To our knowledge, this 
archival literature on social norms in accounting is limited to Hilary and Oshika (2006), who 
examine how shareholders activists and organized crime utilize social norms in Japan, and a 
burgeoning literature on the effect of religiosity on financial reporting.1 2 The challenge for 
                                                          
1
 Among others, Hilary and Hui (2009), McGuire, Omer and Sharp (2012), Dyreng, Mayew and Williams 
(2012), Callen and Fang (2012). 
2
 There is also a theoretical and experimental accounting literature that studies the link between contracts and 
social norms  (e.g., Tayler and Bloomfield (2011)) or the effect of social norms on compliance (e.g., Davis et al.  
(2003)). 
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empiricists is to find measures of social norms in large samples that are ex ante credible but 
not driven by explicit economic mechanisms.  We believe that this is the case in our setting.  
In addition, prior studies have focused on the effects of permanent or at least slow-moving 
social norms (e.g., traditions, religion), whereas we focus on how social norms change over a 
short period of time.  To the best of our knowledge, the dynamics of social norms have not 
been investigated in prior archival studies.   
Aside from a contribution to the accounting literature, we also contribute to the 
literature using natural experiments based on legal changes.  The basic tenet of this approach 
is to divide firms between firms that are affected the passage of a law or a regulation and a 
control sample of firms that are not affected.  Our results suggest that the control sample 
needs to be formed with care as the firms in that sample may react by mimicking the behavior 
of the affected firms, even though they may have no incentive to do so (or may even have 
incentives to do the opposite).  As a consequence, the effect of regulatory changes may be 
understated. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We discuss the prior literature and 
develop our hypothesis in Section II.  We present our research design and data in in Section 
III. We discuss our main empirical results in Section IV and present ancillary findings in 
Section V that are consistent with our interpretation.  We discuss additional results in Section 
VI that are inconsistent with alternative explanations.  We present conclusions in Section VII. 
 
II. Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development. 
Social norms can have a powerful influence on human behavior. People react to other 
people’s behavior even when they have no reason to so.  For example, by enlarging the size 
of a group of confederates looking up from a street corner at an empty spot in the sky, 
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Milgram, Bickman and Berkowitz (1969) were able to increase the percentage of passers-by 
(84%) who followed suit. Cialdini, Kallgren and Reno (1991) conclude that “there is little 
controversy surrounding the impact of descriptive norms [what other people do] on 
behavior.”  In economics, Akerlof (2007) similarly concludes that the effect of norms on 
motivation is ubiquitous.   
Social norms persist because they are self-enforcing (e.g., driving on the wrong side 
of the road creates obvious problems), because they are socially enforced (e.g., lacking 
respect for etiquette is likely to lead to exclusion) or because they are internalized (e.g., not 
contributing to a funeral fund may induce a feeling of guilt).  Their existence can also be 
explained by a desire to conform to group expectations, as has long been observed in the 
social psychology literature.  For example, in a study by Sherif (1936), participants were 
asked to stare at a small dot of light that appeared to move because of an optical illusion. On 
the first day, each person perceived different amounts of movement; after a few days all the 
participants converged to a group standard.   
This conformity may have harmful effects. For example, Latané and Darley (1968) 
report that participants were less likely to report smoke filling the room when confederates 
did nothing more than cough, wave the smoke away and doggedly continue to fill out 
questionnaires.  Becker (1957) (revisited by Akerlof (2007)), observing race relations in the 
pre-Civil Rights era, finds that exchanges between Blacks and Whites could bring mutual 
benefits but that their interaction had a certain disutility because of the psychic cost of 
infringing the social norms of racial segregation.3   
                                                          
3
 We note that it is always possible to fit any decisions in a standard economic framework by making the 
appropriate assumption about the agent utility function.  Our goal is thus not to “reject economic rationality”.  
Rather, our goal is to explore how well our results fit with standard economic frameworks such as the ones we 
explore in the last section of this study.  Similarly, theories of social norms coming from economics, psychology 
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Whereas these studies focus on the behavior of individuals, our focus is on 
organizations.  Although prior research (e.g., Hilary and Hui (2009)) has shown that firms 
can integrate the preference of individuals in their environment, it does not imply that they 
integrate the preferences of other firms in their environment.  In fact, economic modelers 
typically assume that firms are purely concerned by profit maximization.  Thus, the fact that 
individuals have a tendency to conform to certain norms does not automatically translate to a 
similar preference among firms.  However, research in sociology suggests that social 
conformity can indeed be achieved by organizations through imitation (e.g., Haveman 
(1993)), notably DiMaggio and Powell (1983) who developed the (now established) theory of 
isomorphism, and more specifically of mimetic institutional isomorphism.4 5  The intuition is 
that when faced with uncertainty, organizations economize on search costs (Cyert and March, 
1963) and imitate the actions of other organizations, substituting institutional rules for 
technical rules (Meyer, Scott, and Deal, 1983).  During the isomorphic process, a range of 
normal behaviors becomes legitimated and perceived as appropriate, thereby fostering wider 
acceptance of these practices. 
Prior research has shown that institutional isomorphism emerges in open and 
competitive fields and can affect populations as different as textbook publishers, public 
schools, hospitals, municipal governments and corporations (e.g., Han (1994)).  Haveman 
(1993) provides a long list of mimetic organizational changes (such as firm diversification, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
or sociology often offer related predictions.  Our main goal here is not to distinguish between theories of social 
norms.  Rather, we show that our findings are consistent with one of the main theories of social norms. 
4
 As a point of reference, a search of the ISI database in September 2013 found 5,993 citations for the DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) study and 7,657 citations for the Jensen and Meckling (1976) study published 7 years earlier.  
Greenwood and Meyer (2008) note (p.258) that “Few papers achieve the success of DiMaggio and Powell’s 
1983 […]. The impact of the paper, as indicated by its citation count and its influence on a wide range of 
disciplines, has been extraordinary. Furthermore, the paper’s influence continues to increase.” 
5
 DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that there three types (not mutually exclusive) of institutional 
isomorphisms: coercive, mimetic and normative.  The second type is the most relevant to this study. 
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matrix organization or hospital structure) that have been considered in the literature.  A 
classic example is the diffusion of the Civil Service Reform (Tolbert and Zucker (1983)).  
The late 19th and early 20th centuries saw a reform of personnel appointment in US cities.6  
Rossman (2014, p.51) concludes that “civil service reform spread exogenously among 
municipalities when it was mandated state governments but endogenously when state 
government took no action.”  Early adoption rate was related to characteristics associated 
with a cost-benefit analysis based on internal organizational requirements, city characteristics 
and legal requirements.  However, the reform continued to diffuse throughout the US among 
cities that had no apparent reason to adopt it, although the rate was much slower among this 
group and city characteristics no longer predicted the adoption decision.  Knoke (1982) finds 
that strong predictor of diffusion of municipal reform was geographical proximity and 
concludes that the decision to adopt came “from some type of imitation”. 
The effect of isomorphism is not limited to the organizational structure and can 
extend to other firm attributes.  For example, in the finance literature, Leary and Roberts 
(2013) show that peer effects are more important for capital structure determination than 
most previously identified determinants.  Marsh and Merton (1987) and van Caneghem and 
Aerts (2011) contend that firms observe industry practices in the selection of their target 
payout ratio.  Van Caneghem and Aerts (2011) further suggest that the industry is the 
appropriate population of reference because the actions of firms in the same industry are 
more salient than those of firms in other settings (Haveman, 1993; Garcia-Pont and Nohria, 
2002).7  
                                                          
6
 Civil service reform institutes a system of written examinations for municipal appointees and insulated 
administrative personnel from political influence through tenure. 
7
 They indicate that “Consistent with prior research (Porac et al., 1995, 1999), we assume that firms anchor their 
comparability judgments within their primary industry. A firm’s management is likely to be most familiar with 
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We posit that a similar phenomenon is present with firms’ disclosure and transparency 
practices.  Researchers typically argue that uncertainty drives the “diffusion” of 
organizational actions (Mansfield (1961), DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, Greve (1995)).  In 
particular, Greve (1995) notes that in the face of insufficient information to learn from their 
own experience, decision makers apply different heuristic procedures to expand their 
information base (March, Sproull, and Tamuz, 1991).  One such procedure is to examine the 
actions of competitors for clues to their interpretations of the situation.  We believe this 
framework fits our setting reasonably well.  The optimal level of information disclosure is 
likely to be uncertain, and the actual amount of disclosure itself is likely to be measured with 
a margin of error by the firm and by users of financial information.  This uncertainty is likely 
to be exacerbated by the change in environment caused by the passage of the BC laws, hence 
it offers a prime setting for the application of the mimetic isomorphism theory.  The above 
discussion forms the basis of the following hypothesis: 
H1: Followers will conform to changes in practice among industry trend-setters even 
if they have no direct economic reason to change their behavior. 
Based on Tolbert and Zucker (1983), we also expect the phenomenon to be stronger 
when the signal sent by the trendsetters is more salient.  In particular, followers should 
respond more strongly when they are closer to the trendsetters. 
 
III. Research Design and Data 
1) Research Design 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the primary industry and, thus, knowledgeable about its practices. The primary industry characteristics define 
the categories of the product and market attributes that are deemed to be diagnostic of many underlying aspects 
of a firm’s business and processes (Porac et al., 1995).” 
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 Our empirical approach is to regress the transparency of the followers on the 
transparency of trendsetters after the passage of the BC laws.  Our prediction is that the later 
predicts the former.  This does not mean that this relation should only hold after the passage 
of the BC laws.  In fact, theory of social norms suggests this relation should generally hold.  
However, observing that the behavior of firms in the same industry is correlated is, in general, 
not particularly informative.  We expect the behavior of the trendsetters and followers to be 
correlated in all periods but we cannot easily interpret this result as we cannot distinguish in 
most cases between the effect of social norms and the fact that followers and trendsetters face 
similar problems that lead to similar answers.  The passage of the BC laws allows us to use a 
setting in which trendsetters have a clear rational to change their behavior while followers do 
not.  Armstrong et al. (2012) describes this setting as “a pseudo-natural experiment.”  This 
direct effect is large and has been the focus of many studies.   
 
2) Specifications. 
We use four different specifications to establish an empirical link between followers 
and trendsetters.  Our first regression specification closely follows Armstrong et al. (2012), 
but our focus is on understanding how “trendsetters” have an impact on the information 
environment of firms that are not directly affected by the change in legal regime. We estimate 
the following equation:   
, 1 , 1 , , , ,5i t i t s t i t i j t i ty BC TOP Xα λ ϕ β γ ε= + + + + +    (1) 
where i indexes firms, s indexes state of incorporation, j indexes industry and t indexes time. 
αi represent firm fixed effects and λt year fixed effects.  Following Armstrong et al. (2012), 
we cluster standard errors at the state of incorporation level, but our main conclusions are not 
affected if we cluster observations by year and state of incorporation (untabulated result).  
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Y is a vector of dependent variables that measure information environments at t. Our 
choice of proxies for information environment largely follows Armstrong et al. (2012) and 
can be categorized into measures that capture information asymmetry (NPR, PIN), private 
information gathering (SIGMA) and financial statement informativeness (RSQ, EQ).  PIN 
(Easley et al. 2002, LaFond and Watts, 2008) is the probability and intensity of insider 
trading.  NPR (Lakonishok and Lee (2001), Frankel and Li (2004)) is the difference between 
shares purchased and sold by an insider during a given year divided by the total number of 
insider transactions over the same period.  SIGMA (Ferreira and Laux (2007)) is the 
idiosyncratic stock price volatility.  RSQ (Frankel and Li (2004)) measures value relevance of 
financial statements using the R-square of a regression of the stock price on earnings and 
equity book-value. Given the bounded nature of R-square, we use the logistic transformation 
of R-squares in our empirical tests.  EQ (Dechow and Dechev (2002)) is the absolute value of 
the residuals from a regression of current accruals on cash-flows from operations at t-1, t and 
t+1 (controlling for the change in revenues and tangible assets).  The Appendix provides 
additional information on the construction of these variables. 
 BC is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if BC laws are in effect in state j 
during year t-1 and zero otherwise.  TOP5, our treatment variable, is the average value of the 
different proxies for the information environment among the five largest firms (by market 
capitalization) affected by the change in BC laws in industry k in year t-1.8  Since the first BC 
law was passed in 1985, we set TOP5 to zero for pre-1985 observations in our baseline 
specification. 9   To avoid a mechanical relation between the dependent and independent 
variables, we remove observations that are part of the construction of TOP5 from the sample. 
                                                          
8
 In cases in which there are fewer than five firms affected by the law at the industry-year level, we calculate 
averages among the N largest firms affected firms (with N<5).   
9
 Our difference in difference design requires us to keep some observations from the pre-BC period.  However, 
as shown in our other specifications, our conclusions are not affected by this design choice.   
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X is a vector of control variables.  We capture time-varying industry (IndYr) and state-
of-location (StatYr) effects by calculating average value of dependent variables in a firm’s 3-
digit SIC industry and state of location in a given year respectively, excluding the firm itself.  
Controlling for local and industry effects helps to separate out the effects of social norms 
from industry and geographic shocks, or from a common response to industry or geographical 
shocks.  In other words, TOP5 measures the influence of industry peers affected by the 
change in legal regime above and beyond the average commonality in firm behavior.  
Following Armstrong et al. (2012), we further control for firm size, performance (return on 
assets, ROA) and age.  
 We expect φ1 to be positive, that is, we expect the change in legal regime to improve 
the transparency of firms that are located in a state affected by the change in BC laws.  
However, our coefficient of interest is β1.  A significant coefficient indicates that a change in 
behavior of bigger players (or the “trendsetters”) in the industry has a spillover effect on the 
behavior of the other firms in the industry (i.e., the “followers”) above and beyond the impact 
of the law. 
 To further ensure that the relation between trendsetters and followers is not driven 
primarily by the direct effect of the change in the legal regime, we estimate a second 
specification in which we restrict the sample to firms that are not affected by the BC law in 
year t.  In other words, we only include firms that are incorporated in states that never passed 
a BC law or had not yet passed such a law in year t.  For this sample, we estimate the 
following regressions: 
, 1 , , , ,5i t i t i t i j t i ty TOP Xα λ β γ ε= + + + +    (2) 
where the variables are defined as in equation 1.  We expect β1 to be positive in this 
specification. 
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 Our third specification explores an alternative definition of trendsetters.  Specifically, 
we estimate following regression: 
Yi,t = αi + λt + β1 AffTOP5i,t + γ Xi,j,t+ εi,t     (3) 
The key difference between the second and third specifications is the definition of a 
trendsetter.  In both cases we focus on the five largest firms affected by the BC law.  
However, we calculate TOP5 in the second specification using the average values among the 
five largest firms that have already been affected by the passage of a BC law regardless of the 
year during which it was passed.  In contrast, we define a trendsetter as a large firm 
incorporated in a state that passed a BC law in the prior year only in the third specification 
(AffTop5).  Large firms that were affected by a change in legal regime in earlier years (i.e., 
before the year t-1) are not considered to be trendsetters in this specification.  If no BC law 
was passed in a given year, AffTOP5 is considered missing for that year.    
Lastly, our fourth specification estimates Model (2) in first differences.  Specifically, 
we regress changes in dependent variables from t-1 to t on changes in transparency among 
the five trendsetters over the same period: 
∆Yi,t = α0 + β1 ∆TOP5i,t + γ ∆Xi,j,t+ εi,t     (4) 
Where ∆Y represents the change in the dependent variables, ∆TOP5 represent the change in 
transparency for the five largest firms in the industry affected by the BC laws, and ∆X is a 
vector of changes in control variables which includes changes in firm size, firm performance, 
industry-year averages and location-year averages.   
 
3) Sample 
Our sample draws from Compustat, CRSP, Thomson Financial Insider Filings, and 
I/B/E/S. Because the required variables differ across our tests, we require only the availability 
of the necessary variables for a given test.  This approach ensures that we use the largest 
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sample available for each test.  In our baseline sample, we start in 1982 (three years before 
the first BC law was enacted) and end in 1994 (three years after the last BC law was 
enacted).10  
 
IV. Main Results 
1) Descriptive Statistics 
We present the descriptive statistics for the overall sample in Table 1.  Overall, the values 
are reasonably close to those provided in Armstrong et al. (2012).  One apparent exception is 
RSQ but this can be explained by the fact that we use a logistic transformation of the R-
square to account for the bounded nature of the measure whereas Armstrong et al. (2012) use 
the raw value.  The logistic transformation is consistent with the definition of SIGMA 
(Armstrong et al. (2012), Ferreira and Laux (2007)).  The mean and median values of TOP5 
or AffTop5 are close to each other (except for the mean of RSQ).  We also present a 
correlation table in Table 2.11  Consistent with our hypothesis, all the correlations between 
either TOP5 or AffTop5 and the corresponding dependent variables are positive and 
significant at the 1% level.  The pairwise correlations between the different control variables 
are reasonably low (untabulated correlations for the average values of dependent variables in 
a firm’s industry and state of location confirm this).  This suggests that multicolinearity is not 
an issue in our setting.   
In an untabulated analysis, we calculate the univariate correlations between our different 
dependent variables and a new set of variables we call PreAffTop5.  PreAffTop5 is similar to 
AffTop5 except that it is based on the correlation one year prior to the passage of the BC law 
                                                          
10
 Our results (untabulated) are not affected if we consider the 1987-2000 period as in Armstrong et al. (2012). 
11
 Since we have different numbers of observations in our different specifications, univariate correlations are 
based on the largest available sample. 
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whereas AffTOP5 is based on the correlation in the one year after the passage of the law.  We 
then compare the correlation between our dependent variables and either AffTop5 or 
PreAffTop5.  (Untabulated) results indicate that AffTop5 is always greater than PreAffTop5 
(the median ratio of the two correlations is 1.4).  In other words, the correlation between 
“trendsetters” and “followers” increases immediately after the passage of the BC law. 
As noted by Bertrand and Mulainathan (2003), to the extent that they are passed by states 
and are not driven by firm-specific conditions, such laws avoid the endogeneity problem, for 
example, between the change in disclosure and in governance.  It also provides a clear 
rationale to explain why the information environment of the “trendsetters” changed.  Our 
setting is slightly more complicated as we do not consider the direct effect of the change in 
governance on disclosure but of the effect of the “trendsetters” on “followers”.  However, the 
risk of reverse causality seems limited as it is unlikely that the “trendsetters” change their 
disclosure practices in response to the change in the practices of the “followers”.  The change 
in the practices of the “trendsetters” is likely to be driven by the change in legal regime. 
 
2) Baseline Results  
We present our main results in Table 3.  In Panel A, we use the overall sample.  
Consistent with Armstrong et al. (2012), we observe that information asymmetry and private 
information gathering decreased and that financial statement informativeness increased 
following the passage of the BC laws.  The economic magnitude is such that, on average 
across the five specifications, the coefficient associated with BC represents 19% of the 
dependent median value.  For example, in the first specification, the coefficient associated 
with BC is -0.06, while the median value of NPR in the sample is 0.33.  The passing of a BC 
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laws reduces NPR by 18% of its median value.  The passage of the BC law is an 
economically meaningful shock.   
More importantly for our purpose, the coefficients associated with TOP5 are all very 
significantly positive (with t-statistics ranging from 3.0 to 7.1).  These results are consistent 
with the notion that trendsetters are able to affect industry social norms (above and beyond 
the effect of the passage of the law).  The economic effect is such that increasing TOP5 by 
one standard deviation increases the dependent variables by 3% to 18% of its median value 
(depending of the dependent variable).  This suggests that the information environment 
substantially improved even among firms that were not affected by the BC law.  This result is 
consistent with the conjecture of Arrow (1971) that social norms can compensate for market 
failures to price externalities.  The sign, significance and magnitude of the coefficients 
associated with the control variables (untabulated) are consistent with those reported in 
Armstrong et al. (2012).   
However, one possible alternative explanation for our results is that market participants 
were better able to infer information regarding firms not affected by the passage of the BC 
law from those affected by the passage of such a law that improved their transparency.  This 
could explain the observed reduction in informed trading activities as long as the underlying 
economic activities are similar.  However, this alternative explanation based on a passive 
transfer of information is not consistent with our finding that non-affected firms actively 
improved the quality of the disclosure in their financial statements (and with our results in 
Section IV.3).  
Another possibility is that the threat of take-over increased in states that did not pass a BC 
law once other states passed the law.  However, if this was the case, the results in Amstrong 
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et al. (2012) suggest that the transparency of firms incorporated in states where the takeover 
threat increased should decrease, not increase as we observe in our sample. 
Since our sample of non-affected firms contains firms that would be affected by a change 
in BC laws in the future, there may be a concern that these firms improved their transparency 
in anticipation of the future BC law. To address this issue, we incorporate three indicator 
variables that capture the effect of anticipated law change on the information environment. 
BC_1 (BC_2, BC_3, respectively) is an indicator variable equal to one if a BC law is passed 
in a state in one year (2 years, 3 years or more, respectively).  For firms incorporated in states 
that never passed a BC law, these three indicator variables are consistently set to zero.  We 
then repeat our analysis including these indicator variables as additional controls. Our 
findings (untabulated) remain unaffected and none of the three indicator variables is 
significant across various proxies for information environment, suggesting that firms did not 
react in anticipation of a change in BC laws in their own state. 
Another concern is that the passage of the BC laws may affect the governance of 
trendsetters, which may in turn affect the governance of followers and subsequently their 
transparency.  This alternative approach would also be based on social norms but the 
mechanism would be different from the one we have in mind.  However, when Huang and 
Peyer (2013) examined how different corporate governance mechanisms (board 
independence, CEO ownership and director ownership) change in response to the passage of 
BC laws among Fortune 500 firms, they found little effect on corporate governance on 
average.  More importantly for our purposes, our results remain robust when we include these 
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three variables (or an indicator variable to denote the presence of a “poison pill”) in our 
specifications.12  
Next, we turn our attention to our alternative specifications.  In Panel B we present the 
estimates from our second model.  Again, the coefficients associated with TOP5 are all 
significantly positive, with t-statistics ranging from 1.76 to 2.22, even though the sample size 
is divided by 2 to 3 compared to Panel A.  These results suggest that the relation between 
trendsetters and follower is not driven by the change in the legal regime, but rather by the 
spill-over effect of trendsetters that changed their behavior in response to the change in the 
legal regime.  In Panel C we estimate our third model using AffTOP5 instead of TOP5.  The 
sample size is reduced compared to Panel B but AffTOP5 remains significant in all five 
regressions with t-statistics ranging from 2.1 to 4.3.  In Panel D we present the estimates from 
Model (4).  We find that ChTop5 remains significant in four out of five regressions. Overall, 
the different specifications are consistent with our hypothesis that trendsetters are able to 
influence in a statistically and economically significant way the norms of transparency in the 
industry.13 
 
3) Specific Accounting Decisions. 
Results in Column 4 of the different panels in Table 3 indicate that accounting quality of 
the followers followed the quality of the trendsetters.  To better understand this result, we 
examine if specific accounting decisions were also affected.  To this end we consider two 
measures: ADA/Sales (allowance for doubtful account scaled by sales) and Dep/PPE 
                                                          
12
 We obtain board independence, director and CEO ownership from Compact Disclosure.  
13
 We re-estimated all the regressions in Table 3 with two-way clustering at year and state of incorporation level 
and obtained very similar results (untabulated). 
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(depreciation expense scaled by gross Plant, Property and Equipment).  We then regress these 
variables on the average value for the five trendsetters (TOP5Dep and TOP5ADA, 
respectively), controlling for the same variables we use in Model (2).  Untabulated results 
indicate that TOP5Dep and TOPADA are positively related to follower’s behavior (the 
untabulated t-statistics are 1.7 and 3.2, respectively).  Deflating depreciation by sales or 
controlling for the age of the PPE does not affect our results. 
 
V. Ancillary Results 
Having established in Table 3 that trendsetters are able to influence the behavior of 
followers, we next consider three sets of comparative statics.  The goal of the first set (in 
Sections V.1 and V.2) is to verify the predictions stemming from a theory of social norms.  In 
other words, we verify that the theory is not rejected by our empirical findings (but we do not 
specifically attempt to reject other possible explanations in this section as some these 
predictions may be consistent with alternative theories).  The goal of the second set (in 
Section V.3) is to understand the channels of transmission from one organization to another.  
In contrast, the goal of the third set of results in Section VI is to falsify alternative theories by 
rejecting predictions coming from these models. 
 
1) Signal Saliency 
We consider if the effect is more pronounced when the signal sent by the trendsetters is 
more salient and when followers are ex ante more likely to follow social norms.  Specifically, 
we consider two broad dimensions to measure signal salience: proximity of the trendsetters, 
and legitimacy of the signal.   
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Proximity of the Trendsetters. 
First, we consider the geographic, social and economic distance between the trendsetters 
and the followers.  To this end we create three additional variables, TOP5distance, 
TOP5SocProx and TOP5corr.  TOP5distance is the average transparency of the five largest 
firms in the industry affected by a BC law, but unlike TOP5, we use a weighted average 
instead of an arithmetic average.  In the case of TOP5distance, the weights are given by the 
inverse of physical distance between the headquarters of the followers and each of the 
trendsetters.  In the case of TOP5SocProx, the weights are given by the inverse of the social 
proximity of counties in which trendsetters and followers are located.  To this end, we 
consider three social characteristics: income, religiosity and ethnicity.  Details for the 
calculation of this index are provided in the Appendix.  In the case of TOP5corr, the weights 
are given by the correlation between the returns of the follower and the trendsetters.14  We 
use weighted averages rather than interaction between TOP5 and average distance (social 
proximity and correlation, respectively) between trendsetters and followers to better capture 
the distribution of distances (social proximity and correlations, respectively) among the 
trendsetters. 15  In all three cases, trendsetters that are closer to the follower (geographically, 
socially or economically) receive more weight in the average than trendsetters that are further 
away.  We then re-estimate Model (2) but we include TOP5distance, TOP5SocProx or 
TOP5corr in our baseline specifications.  The significance of these three variables 
                                                          
14
 The correlations are calculated using daily stock returns for the past 24 months (we require firms to have at 
least 60 daily observations during this period). 
15
 Note that this approach is different from using an interaction term and is in spirit closer to a “weighted least 
square” approach.  We there do not include a vector of distances or of correlation as a group of separate 
variables.  However, including the average value of the geographical of social distances or of the correlation for 
a given firm does not affect our conclusions. 
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(controlling for the effect of TOP5) implies that trendsetters that are closer to the followers 
have a stronger impact.  In essence, we verify that our weighting scheme as an incremental 
effect above and beyond the effect of TOP5.  
Results presented in Panels A, B and C of Table 4 indicate that TOP5distance, 
TOP5SocProx, or TOP5corr are statistically significant, indicating that proximity increases 
the normative effect of the trendsetters.  The t-statistics range from 2.4 to 9.8 in Panel A, 
from 2.3 to 3.6 in Panel B and from 1.7 to 5.4 in Panel C.  When we decompose SocProx 
along its three dimensions and form three new weighted average (TOP5Inc, TOP5Rel and 
TOP5Ethn), untabulated results indicate that the three measures of social proximity are 
significant in 5, 4 and 4 specifications at the 10% level or better, respectively.16  Our results 
remain when we further control for geographical distance between trendsetters and followers. 
 
Legitimacy of the Signal. 
Next, we consider the legitimacy of the signal along two dimensions, size of the 
trendsetters and homogeneity of the signal.  We expect that more legitimate signals will 
trigger a stronger response from the followers.  It is possible that the five largest affected 
firms in one industry remain relatively small compared to other firms in the industry.  We 
expect that these smaller firms are less powerful trendsetters.  To investigate this conjecture, 
we calculate TOP5big.  This new variable is a weighted average similar to TOP5distance and 
TOP5corr but the weights are the percentile rank of the trendsetter size in a given industry.  
For example, a percentile ranking of 0.99 indicates that the size of a firm (as measured by 
market capitalization) is bigger than 99% of firms in the same industry in a given year where 
                                                          
16
 When we use a measure based on the median income level instead of the income heterogeneity, the measure is 
significant in 5 out 5 specifications.  
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industry classification is based on Fama-French 48 industry definitions.  We include this 
variable in Model (2) and tabulate the results of the estimation in Panel D.  The variable is 
significant in all five regressions with t-statistics ranging from 1.7 to 2.8, suggesting that 
trendsetters have stronger influence on the industry norms when they are larger.   
We also consider the homogeneity of the signal as we expect the effect of trendsetters to 
be stronger when they send a more consistent message.  To test this conjecture, we first 
calculate the coefficient of variation for each of dependent variables using the five firms 
constituting the trendsetters.  CVsignal is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of the 
variable at the group year level divided by the mean.  A high coefficient of variation is a sign 
of heterogeneity in the signal.  We then define TOP5signal, a new weighted average of 
transparency among trendsetters in which the weights are given by CVsignal.17  Results are 
tabulated in Panel E.  Consistent with our conjecture, TOP5signal is negative and significant 
in four out of five measures, suggesting that trendsetters have a weaker influence on social 
norms when they respond to shocks in heterogeneous ways.   
 
2) Follower propensity to follow social norms. 
We then consider two broad dimensions of the propensity followers have to conform to 
social norms: the degree of institutionalization in the environment and follower 
characteristics. 
Importance of Institutionalization. 
                                                          
17
 Since CVsignal is a constant for a given group of trendsetters, this approach is functionally equivalent to an 
interaction term.  We use this approach to maintain the consistency across our different comparative statics. 
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The premise of the isomorphism theory is that, confronted with uncertainty, firms adopt 
the norms of the institutional environment:  the more uncertain the technical answer is, the 
more firms conform to social norms in their environment; the stronger these norms are (i.e., 
the more institutionalized their environment is), the more firms conform.   
To test these predictions, we calculate the coefficient of variation for our five dependent 
variables at the industry level (CVindus).  A higher CVindus is a sign of industry with more 
heterogeneous practices.  We then define TOP5hetero as a new weighted average in which 
the weights are given by the value of CVindus.  We also calculate the percentage of firms in 
the same industry-year that have been affected by BC laws (BCAff).  We then define 
TOP5BCAff as a new weighted average in which the weights are given by the value of BCAff.  
We then re-estimate Model (2) including these additional variables.18  Results tabulated in 
Panel A of Table 5 indicate that TOP5indus is significant at the 10% level or better in all of 
five regressions with t-statistics ranging from -1.8 to -4.7.  Results tabulated in Panel B 
indicate that TOP5BCAff is significant at the 10% level or better in four out of five 
regressions with significant t-statistics ranging from 1.91 to 2.04.  This suggests that 
trendsetters have a stronger influence on industry norms when these norms are less diffuse 
(i.e., more institutionalized).   
To test the prediction that the effect should be stronger when the uncertainty is greater, 
we focus on the aggregate uncertainty in the economy to avoid any endogenous relation.  To 
do so, we calculate the standard deviations of returns on the S&P 500 index and define 
HighUncert as an indicator variable equal to one if the aggregate uncertainty is greater than 
                                                          
18
 This approach is functionally equivalent to an interaction terms between CV or BCAff and TOP5 given that 
the weights are an industry average.  We include CV and BCAff as an additional control in the regression, 
respectively. 
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the sample median, and zero otherwise.19  We then define TOP5uncertain as a new weighted 
average in which the weights are given by the value of HighUncert.  Results tabulated in 
Panel C indicate that the variable is significant at the 10% level or better in four of five 
regressions, suggesting that the effect of social norms is stronger in periods of greater 
aggregate uncertainty.  
 
Ex Ante Importance of Social Norms. 
Next, we examine if followers that have a greater ex ante propensity to be influenced are 
indeed more influenced by trendsetters.  To this end, we examine if the inclusion in dense 
social (i.e., non-professional) networks increases the sensitivity to social norms.  The 
intuition is that socially isolated individuals should be less sensitive to social norms.  To this 
end, we form Top5SocialDens, another weighted average of TOP5 in which the weights are 
given by SocialDens.  SocialDens is the number of people who belong to a social club (e.g., 
bowling, fitness, sport and golf clubs) in a county scaled by population size (as reported by 
the Census Bureau).20  Based on the preference aggregation mechanism described in Hilary 
and Hui (2010), we expect that firms located in areas where people are more sensitive to 
social norms should also be more sensitive to social norms.  Results reported in Panel D of 
Table 5 are consistent with this prediction.  Top5SocialDens is positive in all five 
specifications and significant in four of them.   
                                                          
19
 A typical measure of aggregate uncertainty is the VIX, a measure of the implied volatility of the S&P 500 
index.  Unfortunately, the data is not available prior to 1990.  We use the realized volatility instead of the 
implied volatility.  HighUncert is a year level variable that is absorbed by the year fixed effects. 
20
 We use the updated version of the underlying data that Rupasingha and Goetz (2008) compiled and made 
available on the NERCRD website.  We normalize SocialDens between zero and one.   
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Lastly, we consider two follower characteristics, follower size and the degree of 
monitoring (proxied by the degree institutional ownership) to measure the importance of 
countervailing influences.  The intuition is that large firms and firms that are exposed to 
strong monitoring are less likely to be influenced by industry norms.  Consistent with these 
hypotheses, results in Panel E indicate that the interaction between TOP5 and follower size is 
significant in 4 out of 5 cases.  Similarly, untabulated results indicate that the interactions 
between TOP5 and the percentage of institutional ownership are significant in 4 out of 5 
cases.  These results suggest that firms that are subject to countervailing influences, either 
because they are large or because they are more monitored, are less affected by industry 
social norms.   
Across the different specifications in Sections V.1 and V.2, the maximum VIF range is 
between 1.4 and 3.6 (except for Panel D of Table 5), suggesting that multicollinearity is not 
an issue when we calculate the different comparative statics.  The only exception is in Panel 
D where the VIFs in Columns 2, 3 and 5 are above the conventional levels (from 8.8 to 10.3).  
Overall, the different results from this section are very consistent with the empirical 
predictions yielded by the theory of social norms.   
 
3) The Effect of Professional Networks 
Social norms may be spread through various channels.  One possibility is the direct 
observation of other firms’ behavior.  Another (not mutually exclusive or even inconsistent) 
channel is the effect of professional networks that can more directly affect the adoption of 
social norms.  We consider three main different professional networks that potentially 
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reinforce the diffusion of social norms in matters related to transparency and disclosure: 
similarity in institutional shareholding, in auditors and in analyst coverage.   
To this end, we define TOP5ComInst, TOP5AudSim and TOP5ComAnal.  TOP5ComInst 
is a new weighted average of TOP5, in which weights are the number of common 
institutional owners between trendsetters and the follower.21  TOP5AudSim is a weighted 
average of TOP5, in which the weights are based on the value of AudSim, a measures auditor 
similarity. 22  TOP5ComAnal is a weighted average of TOP5, in which the weights are the 
number of common analysts covering both trendsetters and followers.23  Results in Table 5 
regarding the effect of networks are mixed.  They indicate that TOP5ComInst, TOP5AudSim 
and TOP5ComAnal are significant (at the 10% level or better) in five, three and zero 
regressions, respectively. 24   Perhaps more importantly for our purpose, TOP5 remains 
significant in fourteen out of fifteen specifications.  This suggests that professional networks 
may facilitate the diffusion of social norms (common institutional owners, in particular) but 
they do not fully explain this diffusion.   
 
VI. Alternative Explanations. 
1)  Response to a Change in Economic Equilibrium. 
                                                          
21
 If data on institutional ownership is missing, we set weights equal to zero.  Institutional ownership 
information is obtained from Thomson-Reuters 13F filing. 
22
 AudSim equals 1 if followers and trendsetters use different Big 4 auditors from different states (based on 
firms’ headquarters); 2 if followers and trendsetters use different Big 4 auditors from the same state; 3 if 
followers and trendsetters use the same auditor (i.e., same auditor code) from different states; 4 if followers and 
trendsetters use the same auditor from the same state; and zero otherwise (or if the information is missing).  .  
Auditor information is obtained from Compustat (Variable AU).  
23
 However, the overwhelming majority of firms in our sample do not share common analysts (depending on the 
specification, 1% to 8% of firms in the sample share at least one analyst) and those that do are typically large 
firms (that are less influenced by social norms. This yields a low power test.   
24
 Depending on the dependent variables, the maximum VIFs range between 1.4 and 2.8,.   
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Our explanation for the results in Table 3 is based on adherence to social norms.  An 
alternative explanation is that the change in legal regime induced by the BC laws has changed 
the trade-offs that firms in the economy face.  However, if our main results in Table 3 were 
driven by an economic analysis of the costs and the benefits, we expect that the trade-offs 
associated with an increase in disclosure vary across firms based on their cross-sectional 
characteristics.  For example, firms not affected by the BC laws may decide to increase their 
disclosure because they compete with firms affected by the BC law to raise capital, and those 
firms have increased their disclosure.  If this was the explanation for our baseline results, we 
would expect that unaffected firms that are more likely to raise capital to be more likely to 
mimic the trendsetter behavior. 
To examine this issue, we form four variables. Growth is measure of investment 
opportunity defined as the ratio of R&D to Sales (Chan (1990); Lev and Sougiannis (1996);).  
KZ is a measure of financial constraint based on the measure proposed by Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997).25  CapitalIssue is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm 
issue equity in the current year; zero otherwise (Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003)).26  FCF is 
a measure of free cash flows (Howe, He and Kao, 1992).27  To calibrate our tests, we first 
interact these variables with BC.  Untabulated results indicate that most of the interactions are 
                                                          
25
 KZ is calculated as -1.002*Cash Flow+0.283*Q+3.139*Debt-39.368*Div-1.315*Cash, where Cash Flow is 
calculated as (item# 18+item #14)/item #6, Q is calculated as (item #6+ item #25 multiply item # 199-item #60-
item #74)/item #6, Debt is calculated as (item #9+item #34)/(item #9+item #34+item #216) and Cash is 
calculated as item #1/item #6. 
26
 Following Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003) and Becker and Stromberg (2012), we define a firm as issuing 
equity if the change in equity (change in common equity +change in deferred tax -change in retained earnings 
from one year to the next is positive.  
27
 Following Howe, he and Kao (1992), we measure free cash-flows as operating income before depreciation 
minus interest minus tax minus dividend, all scaled by total asset. 
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significant.28  These significant interactions are consistent with the notion that decisions to 
change transparency and disclosure after the BC laws were made in response to a cost-benefit 
analysis.  They also suggest that our partitions are economically meaningful.   
Next, and more importantly for our purpose, we interact the four partitioning variables 
with TOP5 and re-estimate Model (2).  Results in Table 6 indicate that none of these 20 
interactions is significant, suggesting that the economic environment of the followers does 
not change the propensity to follow the change in social norms.  As a robustness check, we 
consider M/B (defined as the ratio of market to book equity) as an alternative measure of 
growth and D/E (defined as the ratio of debt to equity) as an alternative measure of financial 
constraint.  These new interactions are also insignificant.  We also calculate the elasticity of 
the sales to the various measures of transparency and interact them with TOP5 (we also 
consider the effect of market concentration in Section VI.3).  These new interactions are also 
insignificant, suggesting that the changes are not driven by product market considerations.  
Overall, the fact that none of these 40 interactions is significant is inconsistent with the view 
that our results are explained by a cost-benefit analysis.  We again verify that multicolinearity 
is not driving our results.29   
 
2) Response to a Change in Legal Equilibrium. 
Another alternative explanation for our results is that followers modify their behavior in 
response to a change in the litigation environment.  One possibility is that the litigation risk 
has been indirectly affected by the behavior of the trendsetters.  For example, if juries or 
                                                          
28
 Untabulated results indicate that 16 out of 20 interactions are significant, usually at a significance level lower 
than 1%. 
29
 Untabulated results indicate that the average and maximum VIFs range from 1.4 to 6.3. 
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regulators were to punish firms with subpar disclosure, a change in industry standard may 
worsen the consequences in the event of litigation or enforcement action.  This mechanism is 
also largely based on social norms but through a different channel than the one we have in 
mind (i.e., explicit enforcement in the case of deviation from the norm).  One implication of 
this approach is that firms operating in an environment in which enforcement actions and 
litigation are more likely should be more sensitive to a change in industry standards.  To 
evaluate this possibility, we interact TOP5 with either a measure of SEC enforcement 
probability or with a measure of litigation risk and re-estimate our baseline models.  Our 
measure of SEC enforcement is the distance between the firm headquarters and the SEC 
regional office (Chiu, Teoh, and Tian, 2013).  Our measures of litigation risk is either  the  
number of ex post SEC or U.S. Department of Justice enforcement actions related to financial 
misrepresentation (Karpoff, Lee and Martin, 2008a; Karpoff, Lee and Martin, 2008b) or the 
ex ante probability that a firm is subject to litigation (Kim and Skinner (2012).30  Results in 
Table 7 indicate that only one of these 15 interactions is significant.  In this case, the 
interaction is negative, which is inconsistent with the notion that enforcement risks increase 
the propensity to follow social norms.  Overall, these results are inconsistent with this 
alternative explanation based on legal enforcement.    
A second possibility is that regulators use the change in the legal regime to convey 
information about what society thinks about certain issues.  This function is often referred to 
as the “expressive function of the law” (Sunstein, 1996).  For example, Funk (2007) finds that 
the legal abolition of voting duty in different Swiss cantons significantly decreased average 
turnout, even though the fine for not voting was minimal.  This alternative explanation also 
                                                          
30
 The data on ex post industry litigation over the 1980 to 1995 period for each Fama-French 48 industry are 
from the Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008a,b) database.  To calculate the ex ante probability, we use Model (3) of 
Kim and Skinner (2012).  We calculate the average probability of being sued for each firm over the 1975-1984 
period (i.e., the pre –BC period). 
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relies on social norms, albeit through a different channel than the one we propose.  This 
explanation strikes us as unlikely as the change in legal regime was about business 
combination, not disclosure, and was applicable only to the state of the trendsetters, not of the 
followers. Using this sort of indirect signal to make a point across jurisdictions seems 
unlikely. 
 
3) Herding. 
Another alternative explanation is that managers may decide to herd for rational reasons 
(other than a change in the market equilibrium).  One of the most common reasons proposed 
in the literature for this behavior is job protection (e.g., Devenow and Welch 1996).  If this 
was driving our results, the effect of trendsetters should be stronger when CEOs are more 
likely to lose their job.   
We consider several measures of likelihood of CEO departure: industry competition (e.g., 
DeFond and Park, 1999), recent firm performance (e.g., Jenter and Kannan, 2006) and an 
estimated propensity of CEO departure.31   We then interact these measures with TOP5.  
Results reported in Table 8 indicate that none of these interactions are significant.  As before, 
we verify that multicollinearity is not an issue.32 
 
                                                          
31
 Industry homogeneity is measured using the Herfindhal index of the industry (defined at the 3-digit SIC code 
level).   The recent firm performance is measured using the stock return calculated over the prior 12-months.  
The propensity of CEO departure (exclude retirement) is estimated using the Execucomp database from 1992 to 
2000.  Following prior studies (such as Bushman, Dai, and Wang, 2010; Jenter and Kanaan, 2008; Kaplan and 
Minton, 2008), we model CEO departure as a function of past stock return, accounting performance (ROA), 
stock volatility and firm size, along with industry fixed effect at Fama-French 48 industry level. The coefficients 
of the logistic regression are then used to estimate the propensity in our sampling period. 
32
 Untabulated results indicate that the average and maximum VIFs range from 1.4 to 4.9. 
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4) Learning. 
Lastly, we consider whether followers learn the optimal level of disclosure and 
transparency from trendsetters. A first form of learning would be a standard Bayesian 
learning, in which firms would get closer to the optimal (but uncertain) level of disclosure 
after receiving signals from the trendsetters. If true, then followers should increase firm value 
by following the trend-setters.  In contrast, if firms were at the optimal level pre-shock but 
diverged from this optimal level to follow social norms, the change in transparency should 
destroy value.  To investigate these possibilities, we regress abnormal returns on whether 
firms follow trendsetters, controlling for the change in size and change in ROA.  To measure 
this, we define Same as an indicator variable equal to one if trendsetters and followers change 
the dependent variable in same direction (zero otherwise).  Results reported in Table 9 
indicate that those who follow the trendsetters (at least directionally) experience negative 
abnormal returns, inconsistent with the notion that followers optimally learn from trendsetters. 
A second form of learning is described as informational cascade (e.g., Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992).  In this class of models, the updating is fully rational but a 
sub-optimal equilibrium can be reached nevertheless.  However, this type of model does not 
seem applicable to our setting.  We note, first, that our results in Sections VI.1 and VI.2. 
suggest that firms did not react to a change in equilibrium.  Thus, the learning, if any, would 
have to be about the equilibrium prior to the passage of the BC law.  In this context, firms 
should not draw any inferences from the behavior of firms that adopted the behavior because 
they were forced to.  Additionally, information cascades are based on the notion of behavioral 
coarsening in which an individual take the same actions for multiple signal values.  For 
example, a continuous signal distribution is reduced to a binary decision.  It is not clear that 
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this type of coarsening is descriptive in our setting as the level of disclosure and transparency 
is measured (by construction) with the same granularity as the signal. 
 
VII. Conclusions. 
Social norms can be a powerful way of regulating human behavior but their role has 
not been thoroughly investigated by the accounting literature.  We argue that peer pressure 
may lead companies to behave in ways that are not driven by direct economic incentives.  
Naturally, merely observing that the behavior of agents is correlated is not sufficient to 
validate the hypothesis that these actions are driven by social norms because, confronted with 
the same problem, agents are likely to adopt a similar solution.  Using the passage of BC laws 
as a source of exogenous variation, Armstrong et al. (2012) find that firms subjected to a 
change in legal regime improved their information environments relative to a control group 
(of firms that were not subjected).  In turn, we examine the effect of this change in 
transparency on firms that were not covered by the law (and hence should not have changed 
their behavior) but had peers who changed in response to this exogenous shock.  In other 
words, they had no direct incentive to change behavior but were potentially affected by a 
change in social norms.   
We find that the change in practices among trendsetters influences practices across the 
industry as a whole.  Specifically, a change in transparency among the largest firms following 
an exogenous change to the legal regime lead to an increase in transparency among peer 
firms that were not subject to the change in legal regime.  Comparative statics confirm that 
the effects are stronger when the effect of social norms should be stronger.  Specifically, the 
effect is stronger when trendsetters are closer to the followers (either geographically, socially 
or economically), when the signal is sent by larger trendsetters and is more consistent, and 
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when the aggregate uncertainty is larger.  The effect is also stronger when firms are smaller 
or less subject to countervailing influences, when they operate in industries in which norms 
are more established and when they are located in a county in which the population is more 
likely to be sensitive to social norms. 
In contrast, we find no evidence that economic variables such as growth opportunity, 
leverage, capital issuances, financial constraints or liquidity affect the relation.  Similarly, we 
observe no cross-sectional differences based on the probability of enforcement action or 
litigation.  These results are inconsistent with the idea that followers increase transparency 
after making a cost-benefit analysis.  Inconsistent with models of rational herding, we also 
find no evidence that managers who are more likely to lose their position follow the 
trendsetters (than those less likely to be terminated).  Inconsistent with the notion that 
followers learn about the optimal level of disclosures from the changes made by the 
trendsetters, firms that follow the same directional changes as the trendsetters experience 
negative returns in the following year. 
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Appendix:  Variable Definitions. 
 
I. Measures for information environment 
 
Information Asymmetry 
  We use the probability and intensity of insider trades to capture information 
asymmetry.  Our first proxy for information asymmetry is the Probability of Informed Trade 
(PIN) measure developed by Easley et al (2002).  Using a market microstructure model, 
Easley et al (2002) derive a measure of probability of informed trading and show that stocks 
with higher probability of informed trading attract higher future returns.  The measure was 
subsequently used in other studies as a proxy for information asymmetry (e.g. Armstrong et 
al, 2012; LaFond and Watts, 2008).  We derive this measure from Soeren Hvidkjaer’s 
website. 
 Our second proxy uses intensity of insider trades to capture the degree of information 
asymmetry that exists between insiders and outsiders.  Lakonishok and Lee (2001) show that 
insider trades (mainly insider purchase) convey private information and predict future stock 
returns.  Frankel and Li (2004) show that insiders’ ability to trade profitably on private 
information is limited by corporations’ timely disclosure of value-relevant information and 
information collection by outsiders.  Following these two studies, we use net purchase ratio, 
NPR, as a proxy for insider trading activities, and computed as net purchase (i.e. shares 
purchased minus shares sold) by an insider during a given year by the total number of insider 
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transactions over the same period.33  We obtain insider trading data from Thomson insider 
trading database.  
 
Private information gathering 
 Ferreira and Laux (2007) use idiosyncratic volatility, SIGMA, as a proxy for private 
information gathering.  Following their approach, we study idiosyncratic volatility for each 
stock, estimated for each month using daily return data.  The measure is based on a regression 
of projected stock return on Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model.  Specifically, we estimate the 
following regression: 
, 0 1 2 3 4 ,i d i i i i i i dR MKT SMB HML UMDβ β β β β ε= + + + + +
 
where Ri,d is the return for stock i in excess of the risk-free rate on day d and MKT, SMB, 
HML and UMD are the four risk factors in Carhart (1997) model.  We then compute each 
stock’s relative idiosyncratic volatility as the ratio of idiosyncratic volatility to total volatility 
for each month t.  This is precisely 1-R2, where R2 is obtained from the above firm-specific 
regression.  Given the bounded nature of R2, we use the logistic transformation in our 
empirical test. 
 
Financial statement informativeness 
 We use two proxies to capture financial statement informativeness.  Following 
Frankel and Li (2004), our first proxy, RSQ, measures value relevance of financial statements 
and is computed as R-square from the following firm-specific time series regression: 
, 0 1 , 2 , ,i t i i i t i i t i tP E BVβ β β ε= + + +  
                                                          
33
 Armstrong et al. (2012) calculates NPR by including only trading activities from CEO, CFO, COO and 
president. We deviate from their approach by including all insider trading activities such as those from 
managing director, VP, SVP, directors, treasurer, chief investment officer and chief technology officer.   
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where Pi,t is the price per share of firm i three months after fiscal year end t; Ei,t is the 
earnings per share of firm i during year t and BVi,t is the book value per share of firm i at the 
end of year t.  We require firms to have a minimum of five yearly observations to compute 
the R-square and we estimate the equation as a rolling regression from time t-10 to t.  Given 
the bounded nature of R-square, we use the logistic transformation of R-square in our 
empirical tests. 
 Armstrong et al. (2012) raise the concern that this proxy may be affected by changes 
to price dispersion after the passage of antitakeover laws that are unrelated to the 
informativeness of financial statements.  To mitigate this concern, we use an alternative 
measure of financial statement informativeness that does not rely on the relation between 
financial statement variables and stock price.  Prior studies suggest that a large deviation 
between accruals and cash flows signals lower quality of accounting information (Dechow 
and Dechiv, 2002; Francis et al, 2005).  We estimate discretionary accruals using Dechow 
and Dechiv’s (2002) model augmented by the fundamental variables in Jones’ (1991) model, 
as suggested by McNichols (2002).  Specifically, our measure of financial statement 
informativeness, EQ, is the absolute value of the residuals from the following regressions: 
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 3 , 1 4 , 5 , ,Rei t i i i t i i t i i t i i t i i t i tTCA CFO CFO CFO v PPEβ β β β β β ε− += + + + + ∆ + +
 
where TCAi,t is total current accruals in year t; CFOi,t is cash flow from operation in year t; 
∆REVi,t is change in revenue in year t and PPEi,t is the gross value of PPE in year t.  All the 
variables are defined according to Francis et al. (2005) and are scaled by average total assets.  
We estimate regression annually for each industry with at least 20 observations, using Fama-
French 48-industry classification.  
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II. TOP5SocProx 
TOP5SocProx is the weighted average of transparency of the five largest firms in the industry 
affected by a BC law. The weights are given by the inverse of the social distance of counties 
in which trendsetters and followers are located.  We measure social proximity along three 
dimensions: religious, ethnic and income diversity.  We first calculate diversity measures 
using Blau index (Blau (1977)), calculated as 2
1
1
s
i
i
p
=
−∑ , where s is the number of categories 
and p is the fraction of local residents belonging to category i in county c.  The higher the 
value of Blau Index, the more diverse the local community is with respect to the measure 
under consideration.  Ethnic diversity is measured over five groups: Asians, Blacks, Native 
Americans, White and Others. Income diversity is measured by the Blau index of Median 
Household income over six categories: less than 15k, 15k to 25k, 25k to 35k, 35k to 50k, 50k 
to 75k, and above 75k.  Both ethnicity and income measures are extracted from 1990 US 
Census. Religious diversity is measured by the Blau index of proportion of adherents 
affiliated with local churches, where church types are defined by U.S. Religion Census 
Religious Congregations and Membership Study. We then average diversity measures across 
the three dimensions. Social proximity is the inverse of the distance of average diversity 
measures between trendsetters and followers.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
The sample period is from 1982 to 1994. NPR is the net purchase transactions by management-insiders computed each year as (number of purchase transactions less number of sales transactions) scaled by the (number 
of purchase transactions plus number of sales transactions). PIN is the estimate of probability of information-based trading based on Easley et al (2002). The data is obtained from Soeren Hvidkjaer’s website. SIGMA is 
the monthly logistic transformed relative idiosyncratic volatility. RSQ is logistic transformed R-square from a firm-specific time series regression of price on earnings and book value of equity.  EQ is the absolute value 
of the residuals from a regression of total current accruals on current, lead, lagged cash flow from operation, change in revenue and gross value of PPE, where the variables are scaled by average total assets. 
TOP5_XXX is the average change in transparency among the five largest firms (by market capitalization) in a given industry-year affected by the change in regulation, where transparency is measured by variable XXX. 
For example, TOP5_NPR is the average change in NPR among the five largest firms in a given industry-year affected by the change in regulation. 
 
N Mean Median Std 
NPR 21103 0.223 0.333 0.689 
TOP5_NPR 20441 0.242 0.233 0.313 
PIN 18363 0.215 0.205 0.072 
TOP5_PIN 18155 0.210 0.250 0.122 
SIGMA 47213 1.340 1.261 0.860 
TOP5_SIGMA 47086 1.218 1.414 0.744 
RSQ 33738 0.086 0.177 1.436 
TOP5_RSQ 33482 0.432 0.260 0.749 
EQ 47092 0.061 0.040 0.068 
TOP5_EQ 47057 0.063 0.063 0.049 
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Table 2 Correlations 
This table reports sample correlation. FirmSize is log of total asset. FirmAge is number of years since it first appears in CRSP. ROA is log of one plus operating income before depreciation over lagged total asset. 
AffTOP5 is the average value of different dependent variables among the five largest trendsetters (by market capitalization) in a given industry-year where trendsetters incorporated in a state that passed a BC law in the 
prior year. If no BC law was passed in a given year, AffTOP5 is considered missing for that year. ∆TOP5 is the first difference of TOP5 from t-1 to t.  All the other variables are defined under Table 1. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] 
[1]. NPR 1.00                 
[2].TOP5_NPR 0.06 
[3].AffTOP5_NPR 0.06 0.17 
[4].PIN -0.02 0.00 0.00 
[5].TOP5_PIN 0.01 0.18 -0.06 0.13 
[6].AffTOP5_PIN -0.02 -0.08 -0.03 0.11 0.17 
[7].SIGMA 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.18 -0.02 0.04 
[8].TOP5_SIGMA 0.06 0.11 0.13 -0.01 0.20 -0.04 0.06 
[9].AffTOP5_SIGMA -0.03 -0.09 -0.04 0.11 0.11 0.45 0.01 0.06 
[10].RSQ -0.05 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
[11].TOP5_RSQ 0.02 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.39 0.06 0.01 0.25 -0.12 0.05 
[12].AffTOP5_RSQ -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.16 
[13].EQ -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 0.12 0.07 0.13 0.05 -0.02 0.09 0.07 0.03 -0.09 
[14].TOP5_EQ -0.04 -0.08 -0.11 0.10 0.13 0.22 0.03 -0.07 0.07 0.03 0.11 -0.11 0.23 
[15].AffTOP5_EQ -0.05 -0.08 -0.27 0.06 0.05 0.17 0.01 -0.16 0.08 0.02 0.02 -0.08 0.23 0.53 
[16].FirmSize 0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.59 -0.07 -0.15 -0.25 0.04 -0.12 -0.08 -0.02 0.03 -0.24 -0.21 -0.14 
[17].FirmAge 0.06 0.02 0.05 -0.30 -0.07 -0.07 -0.11 0.01 -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 0.07 -0.15 -0.19 -0.15 0.56 
[18].ROA -0.09 -0.02 -0.09 -0.17 0.02 -0.04 -0.11 -0.03 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.13 -0.03 
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Table 3: Main Results 
Panel A reports regression results of Equation (1).  Panel B includes the sample of firms that are not affected by the BC law in year t and 
reports regression results of Equation (2).  Panel C uses alternative definition of trendsetters and reports regression results of Equation (3).  
Panel D reports regression results of Equation (4). BC is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if BC laws are in effect in state j 
during year t and zero otherwise. TOP5 is the average value of the different proxies for the information environment among the five largest 
firms (by market capitalization) affected by the change in BC laws in industry k in year t.  AffTOP5 is the average value of different 
dependent variables among the five largest trendsetters (by market capitalization) in a given industry-year where trendsetters incorporated in 
a state that passed a BC law in the prior year. Each regression contains the same set of control variables (i.e. Industry-year, State-year, Firm 
size, Firm age, ROA, Firm and year fixed effects).  We capture time-varying industry (Industry-year) and state-of-location (State-year) 
effects by calculating average value of dependent variables in a firm’s 3-digit SIC industry and state of location in a given year respectively, 
excluding firm itself.  All other variables are defined under Table 1 and Table 2. T-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within 
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity 
and are clustered at state of incorporation level. 
 
Panel A All Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
            
BC -0.06 -0.01 -0.04 0.08 -0.01 
(-2.77)*** (-2.52)** (-2.15)** (1.81)* (-2.73)*** 
TOP5 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 
(-0.83) (2.71)*** (2.09)** (2.52)** (4.87)*** 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,883 16,883 45,564 31,979 45,558 
Adjusted R-squared 0.439 0.601 0.242 0.556 0.411 
Panel B Non-affected Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
            
TOP5 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
(1.78)* (2.22)** (1.76)* (2.05)** (2.02)** 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,053 9,379 26,025 18,369 26,182 
Adjusted R-squared 0.305 0.524 0.106 0.550 0.340 
Panel C Alternative Definition of Trendsetters 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
            
AffTOP5 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.09 
(2.20)** (2.22)** (4.28)*** (2.05)** (2.46)** 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,168 5,002 15,082 9,821 14,737 
Adjusted R-squared 0.330 0.532 0.156 0.712 0.341 
Panel D Change in Top 5 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES ∆NPR ∆PIN ∆SIGMA ∆RSQ ∆EQ 
            
∆TOP5 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
(0.63) (2.73)*** (1.82)* (1.82)* (2.00)** 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,366 7,463 19,516 16,765 22,308 
Adjusted R-squared 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.017 
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Table 4: The Effect of Trendsetter Salience 
All regressions include (but not tabulated for brevity reasons) TOP5 and control variables (i.e. industry-year, state-year, firm age, ROA, firm 
and year fixed effects)  TOP5distance is the weighted average of transparency of the five largest firms in the industry affected by a BC law, 
where the weights are given by the inverse of physical distance between the headquarters of the followers and each of the trendsetters.  
TOP5SocProx is the weighted average of transparency of the five largest firms in the industry affected by a BC law, where the weights are 
given by the inverse of the social proximity of counties in which trendsetters and followers are located. TOP5corr is the weighted average of 
transparency of the five largest firms in the industry affected by a BC law, where the weights are given by the correlation between the 
returns of the follower and the trendsetters.  TOP5big is the weighted average of transparency of the five largest firms in the industry 
affected by a BC law, where the weights are the percentile rank of the trendsetter size in a given industry.  TOP5signal is the weighted 
average of transparency of the five largest firms in the industry affected by a BC law, where weights are defined by coefficient of variation 
among trendsetters.  All other variables are defined under Table 1 and Table 2. T-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within 
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity 
and are clustered at state of incorporation level. 
 
 
Panel A Geographic distance to Top 5 affected firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
            
TOP5distance 2.742 0.138 0.710 1.539 1.171 
(3.77)*** (2.44)** (6.15)*** (3.56)*** (9.83)*** 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,586 9,107 25,531 17,813 25,720 
Adjusted R-squared 0.411 0.522 0.124 0.572 0.382 
Panel B Social proximity with Top 5 affected firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
            
TOP5SocProx 0.024 0.002 0.003 0.018 0.012 
(3.05)*** (3.40)*** (2.27)** (3.15)*** (3.64)*** 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,586 9,107 25,531 17,813 25,720 
Adjusted R-squared 0.334 0.521 0.107 0.558 0.347 
 
Panel C Return correlation with Top 5 affected firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
            
TOP5corr 0.056 0.032 0.045 0.064 0.059 
(1.66)* (2.60)** (5.35)*** (2.24)** (2.13)** 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,591 6,919 25,531 17,095 24,640 
Adjusted R-squared 0.308 0.492 0.106 0.554 0.341 
Panel D Relative size of Top 5 affected firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
            
TOP5big 0.023 0.006 0.009 0.025 0.035 
(1.84)* (1.75)* (2.13)** (2.79)*** (2.79)*** 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,053 9,379 26,025 18,369 26,182 
Adjusted R-squared 0.304 0.517 0.106 0.555 0.342 
Panel E Signal Heterogeneity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
            
TOP5signal -0.01 -0.20 -0.08 -0.01 -0.11 
(-1.73)* (-1.96)** (-2.16)** (-0.86) (-1.66)* 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,734 5,269 15,849 10,448 15,279 
Adjusted R-squared 0.30 0.54 0.13 0.69 0.32 
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Table 5: The Ex Ante Probability of Following Social Norms 
All regressions include (but not tabulated) TOP5 and control variables (i.e. industry-year, state-year, firm age, ROA, firm and year fixed 
effects)  TOP5indus is the weighted average of transparency of the five largest firms in the industry affected by a BC law, where weights are 
defined by industry coefficient of variation.  Industry coefficient of variation is the ratio of the mean of the dependent variables at industry 
year level divided by the standard deviation. TOP5uncertain is the weighted average of transparency of the five largest firms in the industry 
affected by a BC law, where weights are equal to one when aggregate uncertainty is high and zero otherwise. TOP5SocialDen is the 
weighted average of SocialDens in the county where company is headquartered. SocialDens is standardized measure of the number of 
people who belong to a social club scaled by population size. TOP5FollowerSize is interaction between Top5 and follower size. All other 
variables are defined under Table 1 and Table 2. T-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 
significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at state of 
incorporation level. 
 
Panel A Industry Heterogeneity  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
            
TOP5indus -0.01 -0.15 -0.42 -0.00 -0.16 
(-2.40)** (-1.76)* (-4.73)*** (-1.75)* (-2.29)** 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,053 9,379 26,025 18,369 26,182 
Adjusted R-squared 0.30 0.52 0.11 0.56 0.34 
Panel B Proportion of firms affected by a BC law 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
  
TOP5BCAff 0.390 0.097 0.020 0.109 0.105 
(1.92)* (1.92)* (0.30) (2.04)** (1.96)* 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,806 9,379 26,025 18,227 26,182 
Adjusted R-squared 0.32 0.52 0.11 0.55 0.34 
Panel C Aggregate Uncertainty 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
            
TOP5uncertain 0.09 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.04 
(2.35)** (2.16)** (-0.71) (1.74)* (1.76)* 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,053 9,379 26,025 24,863 18,369 
Adjusted R-squared 0.31 0.52 0.11 0.35 0.55 
Panel D Social Network Density 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
            
TOP5SocialDens 0.87 0.12 0.03 0.24 0.24 
(2.43)** (1.84)* (0.43) (1.78)* (2.04)** 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,797 8,975 24,962 17,670 25,125 
Adjusted R-squared 0.32 0.53 0.10 0.55 0.34 
Panel E Follower Size 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
            
TOP5FollowerSize -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 
(-1.21) (-2.72)*** (-6.27)*** (-2.59)*** (-1.68)* 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,797 8,975 24,962 17,670 25,125 
Adjusted R-squared 0.32 0.53 0.10 0.55 0.34 
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Table 6: The Effect of Network 
 
TOP5ComInst is the weighted average of transparency of the five largest firms in the industry affected by a BC law, where weight is the 
number of common institutional owner between focal firm and Top 5 affected firms.  TOP5AudSim is the weighted average of transparency 
of the five largest firms in the industry affected by a BC law.  The weights represent the similarity in auditor characteristics.  
TOP5CommonAnals is the weighted average of transparency of the five largest firms in the industry affected by a BC law, where weight is 
the number of analysts between focal firm and Top 5 affected firms. All other variables are defined under Table 1 and Table 2.  Each 
regression contains the same set of control variables (i.e. Industry-year, State-year, FirmSize, FirmAge, ROA, firm and year fixed effects).  
T-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.  Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at state of incorporation level. 
 
 
Panel A Common Institutional Owners 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
            
TOP5ComInst 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.03 
(1.94)* (2.24)** (2.23)** (2.41)** (1.71)* 
TOP5  0.06 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 
 (1.72)* (2.22)** (1.70)* (1.50) (2.03)** 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,053 9,379 26,025 18,165 26,182 
Adjusted R-squared 0.31 0.52 0.11 0.55 0.34 
Panel B Similar Auditors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
  
TOP5AudSim 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.06 
(0.77) (0.68) (1.86)* (1.92)* (2.40)** 
TOP5 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
 (1.77)* (2.26)** (1.77)* (1.74)* (2.20)** 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,372 9,379 26,025 16,330 26,182 
Adjusted R-squared 0.32 0.52 0.31 0.56 0.34 
Panel C Common Analysts 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
  
TOP5CommonAnals -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.01 
(-0.85) (-1.24) (-0.51) (0.66) (0.25) 
TOP5 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 
 (1.95)* (2.25)** (1.76)* (1.82)* (2.03)** 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,797 8,975 24,962 17,670 25,125 
Adjusted R-squared 0.32 0.53 0.10 0.55 0.34 
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Table 7: Change in Economic Equilibrium  
 
Growth is calculated as R&D-Sales ratio.  KZ-Index is the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) measure of liquidity constraint.  EquityIssue is an 
indicator variable dummy equal to one if change in equity from one year to the next is positive.  FreeCashFlow is calculated as operating 
income before depreciation minus interest minus tax minus dividend, scaled by total assets.  All other variables are defined under Table 1 
and Table 2.  Each regression contains the same set of control variables (i.e. Industry-year, State-year, FirmSize, FirmAge, ROA, firm and 
year fixed effects).  T-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively.  Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at state of incorporation level. 
Panel A Growth 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
            
TOP5*Growth 0.029 0.007 -0.000 -0.019 -0.001 
(-0.29) (-0.05) (-0.17) (-0.57) (-0.11) 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,027 9,374 23,309 16,330 23,332 
Adjusted R-squared 0.303 0.524 0.105 0.589 0.338 
Panel B Financial Constraints 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
            
TOP5*KZ-Index 0.037 0.002 0.001 -0.011 -0.002 
(-1.02) (-1.32) (-0.72) (-1.23) (-1.61) 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,956 9,308 25,821 18,279 24,708 
Adjusted R-squared 0.305 0.525 0.107 0.55 0.342 
Panel C Capital Issuance 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
            
TOP5*EquityIssue -0.060 -0.013 -0.007 0.037 0.026 
(-1.07) (-1.00) (-0.55) (1.21) (1.48) 
     Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,032 9,350 25,931 18,326 26,137 
Adjusted R-squared 0.306 0.524 0.106 0.550 0.340 
Panel D Free Cash Flow 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
TOP5*Free CashFlow -0.278 -0.068 -0.024 -0.032 -0.154 
(-0.85) (-1.63) (-0.47) (-0.28) (-1.56) 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,034 9,357 25,942 18,347 26,172 
Adjusted R-squared 0.306 0.525 0.106 0.55 0.36 
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Table 8: Change in Legal Equilibrium 
 
DistSEC is geographical distance between company headquarter and nearest SEC office. ExPostLitigation is total number of SEC or DoJ 
enforcement actions on financial misrepresentation for each Fama-French 48 industry. ExAnteLitigation is estimated by using Model (3) of 
Kim and Skinner (2012) over the 1975-1984 period (i.e., the pre –BC period).  All other variables are defined under Table 1 and Table 2.  
Each regression contains the same set of control variables (i.e. Industry-year, State-year, FirmSize, FirmAge, ROA, firm and year fixed 
effects).  T-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.  Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at state of incorporation level. 
 
 
Panel A Distance to SEC Office 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
       
TOP5*DistSEC 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.08) (-0.94) (-2.27)** (0.97) (0.65) 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,021 9,343 25,843 17,673 25,989 
Adjusted R-squared 0.304 0.524 0.106 0.550 0.340 
Panel B Litigation Risk – Ex Post probability 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
            
TOP5*ExPostLitigation 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.35) (0.33) (-0.22) (-1.38) (-0.89) 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,995 9,329 25,779 18,189 26,022 
Adjusted R-squared 0.305 0.524 0.106 0.548 0.341 
Panel C Litigation Risk – Ex Ante Probability 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
  
TOP5*ExAnteLitigation -0.28 0.01 0.01 -0.10 -0.12 
(0.86) (1.61) (1.39) (-0.78) (-1.51) 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,995 8,561 18,905 16,069 18,213 
Adjusted R-squared 0.290 0.527 0.109 0.543 0.324 
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Table 9: Rational Herding  
 
Herf is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. PastRet is the log of one plus stock return over the past 12 months. Departure is the estimated 
propensity of CEO departure using Execucomp database from 1992 to 2000. All other variables are defined under Table 1 and Table 2.  
Each regression contains the same set of control variables (i.e. Industry-year, State-year, FirmSize, FirmAge, ROA, firm and year fixed 
effects).  T-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.  Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at state of incorporation level. 
 
 
Panel A Industry Homogeneity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
   
TOP5*Herf -0.210 0.018 -0.070 -0.133 -0.009 
(-0.71) (0.34) (-1.05) (-1.19) (-0.33) 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,053 9,379 26,025 18,369 26,182 
Adjusted R-squared 0.311 0.588 0.104 0.616 0.296 
Panel B Past Performance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
            
TOP5*PastRet -0.071 -0.008 -0.013 0.034 0.006 
(-0.83) (-1.62) (-1.32) (1.25) (0.22) 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,053 9,379 26,025 18,369 26,182 
Adjusted R-squared 0.307 0.523 0.107 0.551 0.346 
Panel C Propensity of CEO Departure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
            
TOP5*Departure -0.141 0.024 -0.032 0.015 -0.000 
(-0.98) (1.22) (-0.74) (0.19) (-0.01) 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,506 9,302 25,527 17,843 22,301 
Adjusted R-squared 0.316 0.524 0.109 0.551 0.346 
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Table 10: Social Norms Conformity and Price Reaction  
 
AbRet is the excess return over value weighted market index at t+1.  Same is an indicator variable equal to one if trendsetters and followers 
change the dependent variable in same direction (zero otherwise).  ∆Assets is change in total assets from t to t+1.  ∆ROA is change in ROA,.  
All other variables are defined under Table 1 and Table 2.  T-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at state 
of incorporation and year level. 
 
 
NPR PIN SIGMA RSQ EQ 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES AbnRet AbRet AbRet AbRet AbRet 
            
Same  -0.017* 0.007 -0.013* -0.042* -0.056* 
(-1.78) (0.37) (-1.73) (-1.76) (-1.74) 
∆Assets -0.177*** -0.133*** -0.218*** -0.192*** -0.271*** 
(-3.02) (-4.82) (-7.00) (-8.64) (-7.47) 
∆ROA -0.024 -0.059 0.007 0.011 -0.050 
(-0.21) (-0.84) (0.22) (0.18) (-1.40) 
      
Observations 6,352 7,875 20,779 16,886 21,598 
R-squared 0.010 0.009 0.042 0.013 0.015 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster incorp+year incorp+year incorp+year incorp+year incorp+year 
 
